INTRODUCTION
In a time of increasing healthcare costs, strained public budgets and changing patterns of disease, the discussions over how society should allocate scarce healthcare resources is often influenced by an idea of personal responsibility. The burden from non-communicable chronic diseases is pivotal to this discussion, and much attention has been given to lifestyle related chronic diseases. Some suggest that when people's choices result in a greater need for healthcare, we should give them lower priority, than those who are suffering from diseases unrelated to their own choices. In many ways, this corresponds to a central intuition of luck egalitarianism; an influential theory of distributive justice. Luck egalitarians assert that distributions are just, if and only if, people's relative positions reflect their exercises of responsibility. [1] The luck egalitarian approach is concerned with people's past choices, how they have hitherto exercised their responsibility, and, in that sense, it is backward-looking. Such notions of responsibility have gained much attention in the normative debate on allocation of healthcare. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] In an interesting contribution to this discussion, Eli Feiring has proposed that when allocating scarce healthcare resources, we should abandon the backward-looking concept of responsibility. [12] Instead, we should be concerned with what she calls a forward-looking concept of responsibility. In short, it considers people's post-treatment lifestyle to be the right focus for a responsibility-catering approach to healthcare. Although it is developed in the context of obesity, Feiring clearly believes it is relevant for other diseases since she also mentions alcohol consumption and smoking in her discussion. [12] To understand Feiring's notion of forward-looking responsibility, it is instructive to consider the two main reasons she offers for rejecting a backward-looking concept of responsibility. First, she submits that it is often both philosophically and practically difficult to assess whether something has happened as a consequence of choice or is more reasonably attributed to a person's circumstances. Second, she argues that the process of establishing whether some health disadvantage can be attributed to choice or circumstance may be intrusive, demeaning and shameful for the person under assessment. [12] Consequently, Feiring finds it necessary to abandon the idea of backward-looking responsibility in healthcare. This conclusion, however, does not imply that there is no room for responsibility in the allocation of scarce healthcare resources. Focus should rather be on the forward-looking responsibility. The content of this concept is explored in the next section.
FORWARD-LOOKING RESPONSIBILITY
Instead of a backward-looking concept of responsibility, Feiring proposes one that looks to the future. This section examines her reasoning when developing the concept and her reasons for preferring it. She maintains that, on a fundamental level, we should be concerned with how sick people are and with the expected positive effect of treatment.
Furthermore, she maintains that "severely ill patients who are likely to respond well to treatment…should, under the specified understanding of medical need, be given priority over patients less likely to benefit." [12] It is in the pursuit of such considerations that the concept of forward-looking responsibility emerges. In accordance with Feiring's argument, consider the disease x, which people acquire both for reasons related to lifestyle (r1) and for reasons unrelated to lifestyle (r2). Feiring's critique of backward-looking responsibility concludes that it would be wrong to give priority to the people whose disease is unrelated to lifestyle at the expense of those whose disease is in fact related to lifestyle. According to Feiring, this does not exhaust the role for personal responsibility in the way the healthcare system deals with x through the employment of medical intervention (i2). The concern for the expected benefit from treatment brings the idea of forward-looking responsibility into the discussion. As Fering reasonably stipulates, "several factors may reduce the expected benefit of treatment." [12] Some of the factors are circumstances beyond our control, while we may be in a position to improve upon other factors. Feiring counts our post-treatment lifestyle to be among the latter factors. [12] The lifestyle people pursue can adversely affect the outcome of the prescribed treatment in a wide range of cases. This includes people who consume alcohol after receiving a liver transplant, and people who eat to excess after receiving a bypass surgery. Feiring argues that we should give priority to people who are willing to commit to a change of lifestyle: "If the patient refuses, then she cannot reasonably complain to be given lower priority on the waiting list." [12] . Her suggestions for implementation is as follows: Two persons turns to the healthcare system with the disease x. Person A has a lifestyle which we know can lead to disease x, while person B does not.
Whether person A will receive treatment on equal terms with person B depends on his willingness to sign a contract declaring a commitment to undertake medical follow-ups and other activities aimed at changing the lifestyle in question, thus increasing the benefit of treatment. Those who refuse to sign such a contract is given lower priority on the waiting list. [12] On this account, healthcare personnel should not indulge in whether "it would have been obtainable for one in the patient's circumstances to make a greater effort to get a healthy lifestyle in the past." [12] Thus, the notion of responsibility is forward-looking.
The remainder of this article critically engages with Feiring's position. The first section elaborates the implications of Feiring's view through a closer look on the values underpinning it. It shows that her position should be applied to a broader range of cases than her discussion suggests. The second section criticizes her conceptual distinction between responsibility in past and future, while the third section argues that her suggested way of dealing with non-compliers is inconsistent.
Elaborating on the implications of Feiring's position
This section elaborates on the implications of Feiring's concept of forward-looking responsibility through an examination of the values underpinning it. On a fundamental level, her reasoning is contractual; searching for a principle people cannot reasonably reject. In the more specific arguments for her position, she presents two moral values in support of her concept of forward-looking responsibility. This section presents those values and labels them increasing benefits and reciprocity respectively. Increasing benefits stems from the plausible thought that we should be attentive to how much good the provided resources will do for the person they are allocated to. Feiring embraces this value, when she writes that "ill patients who are likely to respond well to treatment (within given resource constraints) should, under the specified understanding of medical need, be given priority over patients less likely to benefit." [12] According to Feiring, this value justifies giving priority to those who agree to change their lifestyle, because it increases the expected benefit of treatment. I Feiring's contractual idea is that people cannot reasonably reject this position. [12] . when it will increase the benefit of treatment, regardless of whether the chosen lifestyle could have caused the medical need or not. Furthermore, people should be given lower priority in the healthcare system if they decline to do so. Such a broader application of the concept of forward-looking responsibility could and should be welcomed by Feiring, but will not be exploited in the critique that follows.
CRITIQUE OF FEIRING
Today was the future yesterday: Feiring's inconsistent cut between past and future
II
In this section it will be argued that Feiring's differentiation between the choices facing us before and after we become ill is arbitrary and ultimately saddles her with a strange view on responsibility. Do the values of increasing benefits and reciprocity commit us to increase the benefits of our share of resources and to minimize the amount of extra resources needed to treat us in the future? According to Feiring, this is the case at t2, when a person is asked to commit to a lifestyle change as a precondition for receiving treatment, and at (an eventual) t3 when a new medical need arises related to the same lifestyle. But is it also the case at t1, II The possibility that Feiring could accept this broadening was suggested by both reviewers.
before the medical need arises? Feiring denies this. Drawing on an example from Scanlon, it will be argued that the distinction between past and future choices is less crucial than
Feiring suggests.
The local town council is tasked with the removal of hazardous waste. The health risks of leaving it be would be huge, but removing it involves a much smaller although significant health risk (i.e. chemicals evaporating into the air during transport). [13] The town council does as much as could be expected of them in notifying the citizens prior to the event, and in shielding the relevant digging sites. Person C receives the information and chooses to travel to the site, climbs the fence and gets sick as a result. Adding to Scanlon's familiar story, suppose that in addition to making people sick the exposure also makes them extra vulnerable at a possible later exposure. On Feiring's account, person C must pledge to avoid such risks in the future, and compliance becomes a precondition for treatment on equal terms with others. Person C makes such a commitment. As it happens, another chemical deposit must be moved on a later occasion. Person C gets sick as a result of acting as before, with all else remaining equal.
This modified example raises serious doubts over Feiring's sharp distinction between the concepts of backward-and forward-looking responsibility. In her own reasoning, Feiring leans on a view on responsibility often associated with Scanlon. Here, responsibility has to do with whether something bad (or costly) was avoidable, and we might add that we also care about how difficult or costly it was to avoid. [13, 14] Such a view on responsibility is neutral on the subject of time. Instead, it sets up a number of conditions that must be in place before a person can be said to be responsible for a state of affair. Whether such conditions are in place can change over time, but which factors that are relevant should not.
The example with person C shows that Feiring's position is inconsistent. On Feiring's account, person C will only suffer the consequences for his imprudent behaviour the second time, even though other factors were equal. This is counter-intuitive and suggests a questionable view on responsibility. Consequently, when Feiring argues that people's posttreatment behaviour can be taken into account, we really should be wondering why this is not the case with pre-treatment behaviour. The right question to ask must be under which conditions people made their choices, which alternatives were available to them and how difficult or costly it was to pursue those alternatives.
It can be the case that such information is difficult to uncover or that trying to do so is demeaning or wrong towards people. But that applies equally at t1, t2, and t3, and it gives us no reason to talk of responsibility only at t2 and t3. 
Consequences for non-compliers
This section examines a critique of how Feiring's account treats those who agree to change their lifestyle but fail to do so. The strength of this critique is independent of the arguments presented so far, and thus proceeds as if the distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility can be upheld. Thus, the section proceeds as if we are justified in refusing to take people's past choices into account. Feiring's positions of forward-looking responsibility furthermore seem to overlook how people's circumstances affect their abilities to fulfil their commitments to lifestyle change. This is quite remarkable since her critique of luck egalitarianism and backwardlooking responsibility was built around such a concern. Consider again person C, from the example of removal of hazardous material. For the purpose of the argument, it is admitted that Feiring is correct in giving him the option at t2 to avoid futureexposure. But suppose that the first exposure severely reduces his capacities and judgements. He agrees to avoid future exposure, but nevertheless fails to comply with the agreement. Intuitively, we would not count such a breach of agreement against him. But Feiring must submit that we should.
The most obvious solution available to Feiring would be to suggest that how we treat people's second instance of medical need related to a specific lifestyle or choice of action should depend on an individual assessment of the effort made to follow through on the commitment to a lifestyle change. We could perhaps inquire into their own reasons for this failure, how often they attended the required meetings and how the medical staff judged their commitment to the required program. Presumably, people do differ in their efforts and in the extent that their failure can be explained by social circumstances. Some would have good reasons for non-compliance and others would have ignored instructions, failed to honour agreements and showed a lack of effort. If we tried to assess which is which, one could argue that the above concern over the influence of circumstances on people's ability to change their lifestyle could be mitigated. However, this most plausible solution cannot consistently be applied by Feiring, since she argues against backward-looking responsibility that any attempt at assessment may involve shameful revelations and be demeaning for the person whose choices and circumstances are under assessment. Those who would like to argue that this is too simplistic a view on our methods of retrieving information should acknowledge that this argument would be open to those favouring backward-looking responsibility as well. In conclusion, it would seem that any plausible version of Feiring's forward-looking responsibility, that is any position which involves actual consequences when people fail to live up to the agreements they have entered into, will seem vulnerable to at least one of the critiques she laboured against backward-looking responsibility.
Even if Feiring is right (as doubted in the previous section) that we should treat pretreatment and post-treatment behaviour in radically different ways, her treatment of noncompliers is inconsistent with what she states elsewhere. Furthermore, her position is less attentive to social and natural circumstances than any luck egalitarian approach would ever be (since any breach seems to count against people).
CONCLUSION
The above sections discussed three important elements in Feiring's concept of forwardlooking responsibility. First section elaborates on who the concept is applicable to by presenting arguments that it should be applicable in a broader way wider sense than her discussion suggests. Second, and more profoundly, the values she subscribes to suggest that people should act in ways to take care of their health and that failure to do so should result in lower priority in the health care system. Our past choices matter, and the strong normative emphasis she places on the distinction between past and future saddles her with an implausible view on responsibility. The third section considered how Feiring's account treat those who fail to live up to the agreements made prior to receiving treatment. It submits that the consequence she allows of such non-compliance is inconsistent with what she writes elsewhere, and it is surprisingly inattentive to people's circumstances.
